Abstract: Considering the representation of youth in the Brazilian population, it is important to comprehend young people perceptions regarding democratic values and the political system. Thus, we seek to identify the characteristics of the political culture of youngsters in Southern Brazil. For that purpose, we analyzed different factors such as the type of school attended (public or private), quality of education and average family income. Our hypothesis is that young people have been increasingly linking democracy to subjective and post-material aspects, with different emphasis depending on their socialization. The data used was obtained from a survey of 2,035 people between 13 and 24 years old in Florianópolis (SC) and Curitiba (PR) in 2016 and Porto Alegre (RS) in 2015 — the three capitals of Southern Brazil.

Key words: Democracy; Political Culture; Post-material values; Political Socialization; Young People

Received on: 09/05/2018
Accepted on: 20/08/2018
CULTURA POLÍTICA NO SUL DO BRASIL: PERSPECTIVAS DOS JOVENS SOBRE A DEMOCRACIA

Resumo: Considerando a representatividade dos jovens dentro da população brasileira, se faz importante compreender as percepções da juventude sobre valores democráticos e os processos políticos. Assim, buscamos compreender as características da cultura política dos jovens, considerando que fatores como o tipo de escola frequentada (pública ou privada), qualidade da educação e renda familiar demonstram a existência de diferentes juventudes no sul do país e, nesse sentido, de valorizações e expectativas distintas quanto ao funcionamento da democracia. A hipótese trabalhada é a de que os jovens têm relacionado cada vez mais democracia a aspectos subjetivos e pós materiais, porém de diferentes maneiras, considerando a sua socialização. Para realizar esta análise, utilizamos dados obtidos em uma pesquisa survey conduzida com 2035 jovens entre 13 e 26 anos nas três capitais do sul do Brasil: Porto Alegre/RS, em 2015, e Florianópolis/SC e Curitiba/PR, em 2016.

Palavras chave: Democracia; Cultura Política; Valores pós-materiais; Socialização Política; Juventudes
1. Introduction

The importance of citizenship for democracy has been a principal axis of analysis for studying political culture. However, the institutions responsible for mediating the political process have been insufficient in guaranteeing an egalitarian democracy, as they have also failed in building an active civic culture in Brazil.

Within this framework, the different processes of political socialization influence the way young people view the democratic process and what the term democracy means to them. In times of political and institutional crisis, it is relevant to comprehend young people’s understanding of what is at stake in the democratic process. In this respect, this article aims to address the diverse views that young people have about Brazilian democracy, considering their own demographics. It is believed that facts such as the type of school attended (public or private) indicate the existence of different types of youths in Southern Brazil. Consequently, young people often hold different expectations about how democracy functions (or should function) in society.

Thus, the central hypothesis we seek to work on is that different types of youths have different interpretations about democracy and use different ways to interact with politics due to differences in their background (either in the socioeconomic context or by the quality of the educational complex in which they are students). In order to carry out this analysis, we used data from Democracy, Media and Social Capital: A study of the youth in the South of Brazil; this was developed by the Research Center on Latin American Studies (NUPESAL/UFRGS) with 2,035 people between 13 and 24 years old in the three capitals of Southern Brazil: Porto Alegre/RS (in 2015), Florianópolis/SC, and Curitiba/PR (both in 2016). The 2,035 young people represented a randomized and stratified sample.

The probabilistic nature of this sample allows us “to select a set of elements in a population such that the descriptions of these elements accurately represent the total population of which have been selected” (Babbie, 1999: 125) and the sample stratification allows us to reach the target audience. The data presented verifies our main hypothesis that there are different types of youths in the country with different values regarding democracy. This article is structured in four parts. First, we discuss political culture and political socialization among young people. Next, we discuss different youths and their perspectives. Third, we analyze relevant data. In conclusion, we offer some final considerations and results.

2. Democracy, political culture, and socialization among young people

Political culture “refers to the specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes about the role of the self in the system”
(Almond and Verba, 1963: 12). Almond and Verba (1963), pioneers on political culture studies, used the aforementioned concept to apply a citizenship model that would be ideal for democracy. They defined three types of political orientations: affective (related to feelings); cognitive (knowledge and beliefs about the political system); and evaluative (opinions and values). These also lead to three different types of political culture: parochial (or traditional); subject; and participative. Based on England and the United States as political models, Almond and Verba created the concept of civic culture as being formed by a combination of the population being both participants and subjects; in essence, a political culture that moderates government elites and the population is the ideal model of citizenship and the model required to sustain a democratic system.

In 1977, Inglehart initiated a new dynamic of studies in the political culture field. Inglehart affirms that post-material values develop in societies where the material primary needs (i.e. housing, education, health, and security) are met, resulting in more political engagement and support for democratic values. With this value change, there is a trend of greater engagement of citizens in politics and not only through voting. As a result, we can also find a decrease of trust in traditional institutions as well as a shift in the political balance between the elites and the masses – an outcome of education expansion and mass communication. So, new individual values affect individual opinions of politics and political participation channels.

In a later study, Abramson and Inglehart (1994) found that education in the formative years has a strong association with economic prosperity and post-material values. However, intergenerational shifts have been changing the values system. Thus, new values will be created and prevail according to education levels. It is important to highlight that supporting democratic values is not an automatic consequence of a higher level of education since specific historical conditions are also a factor (Abramson and Inglehart, 1994).

Inglehart and Welzel (2009) improved this theoretical frame through the ideal of human development in political culture, because economic modernization (which increases material, cognitive, and social resources) and cultural change encouraging an increase in self-expression point to democratization as part of the human development process. These post-material values of self-expression highlight characteristics such as political and personal freedom, civil protest activities, respect for others’ freedom, and aspects related to the quality of life (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009).

Emancipatory values and autonomy (the results of self-expression values) are required for democracies to progress (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009) and also related to the rise of a more assertive political culture (Welzel and Alvarez, 2014). These values permit a more liberal meaning of democracy, also leading to a more critical perception of it. Therefore, the combination of a desire for democracy and emancipatory values tend to boost democracy. However, when the desire for democracy is not followed by emancipatory values, lack of those values does not create mass pressure; this lack of values indicates a desire for democracy based on different goals that

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.31068/tp.27207
can be falsely disseminated as democratic, since there are different perceptions about what democracy means (Welzel and Alvarez, 2014).

Ribeiro (2008), trying to apply those ideas to the situation in Brazil, noticed that post-material values are also likely related to a greater option for democracy nationally – even in the political and socioeconomic context of marked inequalities. Meanwhile, traditional channels still have big signification – even among those who have post-material values. Ribeiro’s research also did not find more critical citizens comparing material and post-material values, since there are high levels of distrust and dissatisfaction in both groups. Therefore, this theoretical frame should be carefully applied to young democracies – but always in consideration of the relevant contexts.

The building of a population’s political culture, as well as its reproduction of behaviors through intergenerational changes, happens through the political socialization process. Political socialization is internalizing the norms, traditions, and political values of a society; those values can be continuous but are also subject to change throughout people’s lives (Almond and Verba, 1963; Baquero and Baquero, 2014). For Schmidt (2000: 56), political socialization represents a “process of forming political attitudes on individuals or, by the generational perspective, a process of interiorizing the existing political culture in a social environment by the new generations”. According to Easton and Dennis (1967: 7), it comprehends the development processes by which people acquire political orientations and behavioral standards.

Several agents (i.e. family, friends, associative groups, schools, etc.) should be considered when we talk about political socialization processes. Also, there is no consensus about which one of these agents is the most important. Herbert Hyman (1959) conducted the first political socialization studies. During this era, it was believed that the family would have the most decisive influence on political orientations. In this framework, familial socialization (starting in early childhood) determined political orientations (Beck and Jennings, 1975). In the second phase of studies on socialization, Paul Beck (1977) determined that when families do not have the minimal socioeconomic and cultural conditions necessary for individual development, schools become the most influential agent of socialization and become a central space for political education. By the 1970’s, socialization studies expanded beyond childhood because socialization is ongoing (Beck, 1977; Jennings and Niemi, 1974; Mishler and Rose, 2007).

Thus, when considering socialization as a dynamic process, it is important to understand the role and influence of the agents involved in it. Beck (1977) writes that the presence of relatives as the main agents of socialization begins to decrease once young people start to attend school (usually at the age of five).

Several recent studies of Brazil discuss the importance of the teenage years on the process of internalizing and forming values, feelings, and behaviors towards politics (Schmidt, 2000; Nazzari, 2005; Baquero and Baquero, 2014; Zorzi, 2016). The aforementioned authors point out that early childhood (especially in school) is one the most critical times for cognitive development.
and when people generally internalize political issues the most (Baquero and Morais, 2015). Schmidt (2000) also writes that schools can be considered the only socialization agency responsible for directly and intentionally transmitting political attitudes, as “teaching is strictly the planned and systematic transmission of knowledge about society and the world” (Schmidt, 2000: 69). Also, school reproduces an indirect influence by relationships with teachers and classmates as well as practical educational experiences.

School is also very important as a stimulator of political efficacy. The concept of political efficacy concerns the relationship between the citizen and the political system. Efficacy or subjective civic competence (Almond and Verba, 1963) refers to how much individuals believes they can influence the political system and how much they believe their actions will make a difference in politics – this is related to the concept of trust in the system (Ponte, 2006: 286). Above all, the importance of this concept lies in the relationships established in the social world; that is, between the non-institutionalized spheres of associativism and those that are strictly political, institutionalized, or directly linked to the State (Schmidt, 2000: 42-43).

Beaumont (2010) lists four important variables that, according to studies in political science and psychology, are highly related to the different levels of political efficacy in the population:

- Political participation;
- Socioeconomic status (SES), including education levels, race, and gender;
- Civic resources, including political knowledge, skills, motivations, social networks, and experiences;
- Political socialization, including the learning and experiences of young people in families and schools (Beaumont, 2010: 530).

Therefore, a qualification of the educational system and specific efforts in schools aimed at increasing the political effectiveness of young people can have positive long-term effects – especially in their political participation beyond socioeconomic effects (Sohl, 2014; Beaumont, 2010; Bernardi, 2017). In order to deepen the study of political socialization in young people, Sofia Sohl (2014) identifies three main benefits that can be obtained in stimulating political efficacy for greater citizen inclusion:

- Political efficacy has an intrinsic value as a quality of citizenship;
- Political efficacy strengthens democratic participation by making citizens politically active;
- Political efficacy carries the potential to remedy some of today’s political inequality, provided that it can be stimulated among the least advantaged at an early age. In other words, political efficacy can be considered both as a freestanding positive citizenship quality and as a means for the achievement of other positive features of a functioning democracy (Sohl, 2014: 14-15).
Hence, quality education appears as a component of citizenship’s formation in the society, once the articulation between school and the outside world allows its recognition and construction (Reis and Máximo, 2013: 10). According to Paiva (2012: 82), “education is a practice that occurs in a historical social context which contains cultural, economic and political dimensions” – so the educational system is designed as a reflex of a conception of a society that materializes on the action of State through public policies.

3. Political culture and different youths in southern Brazil

In the case of Brazil, there is extensive literature aimed at portraying the construction of the citizenship, the culture, and the Brazilian State (Leal, 1978; Faoro, 1979; Holanda, 1992; Carvalho, 2004). Buarque de Holanda (1992) emphasizes the Iberian heritage of Brazil’s colonization as well as the personalist attributes that characterize the structuring of power. Such characteristics are also attributed to the lack of construction of a “democratic memory” by the population due to the numerous interruptions of the institutional state in Brazil, which has its history restricted to brief democratic intervals permeated by a series of ruptures and attempts to seize power. A culture of historical features (clientelism, patrimonialism, and personalism) marked by an authoritarian political culture combined with an agreed upon process of democratization between the military government and the new political elites in 1964, created a hybrid political culture that merged a positive perception of democracy and authoritarian values and attitudes (Schimidt, 2000; Bernardi, 2017).

The construction of youth citizenship is a topical strategic issue, not only due to the number of young people in the country (up to 17.24% of the population, according to the IBGE Census 2010), but also because of the difficulties imposed on the socialization of these young people by the structural framework of the Brazilian political culture. Recent studies about political socialization in Brazil have attempted to determine how the young people who grew up in a relatively stable democratic environment understand politics, democracy, and their roles as citizens in the current climate of social inequality.

The Research Center on Latin America (NUPESAL), coordinated by Professor Marcello Baquero, has periodically analyzed data on political socialization in Southern Brazil, seeking to assess what young people think in a longitudinal perspective; this has generated a series of relevant articles, dissertations, and theses (Silveira, 2005; Silveira and Baquero, 2014; Zorzi, 2016; Bernardi, 2017; Morais, 2017). For instance, Baquero and Baquero (2014) found that in Porto Alegre, 55% of young people in 2001, 58% in 2004, and 67% in 2010 did not usually participate in
any political activity. Bernardi (2017), when comparing the process of political socialization in high school in the years 2002 and 2015 in Porto Alegre, found a discrepancy in civic competence and the valorization of democratic attitudes among young people from public and private schools. The data showed great inequality in the quality of the educational system between public and private schools, which is reproduced in the index of civic competence (Hoskins et al., 2008).

Despite the increase in public investment in education, the youths who attended public school in 2015 not only reduced their civic competence index in relation to 2002, but also widened the gap from the indicators of civic resources and democratic values in comparison to private schools in 2015. Educational quality indicators, such as the ENEM\(^3\), show a high correlation between civic competence and the quality of school education. For example, when evaluating the results of the ENEM in Porto Alegre, the first state public school mentioned is ranked 30 out of 113 schools in the city. It should be stressed that this inequality in basic education will also be reflected in future school years, given that the ENEM is used as a method of entrance into most public (and some private) universities. Hence, it is evident how the educational and socioeconomic systems support a structural basis of rigid political inequality (Bernardi, 2017).

Therefore, thinking about political socialization and youth involves a series of conditionalities, such as the public educational system in Brazil. Access to education was a privilege of the middle and upper classes of Brazilian society until very recently. When the Constitution of 1988 was ratified, the process of expanding public schools began; this process has intensified in the last decade, allowing an increasingly heterogeneous contingent of young people to attend secondary schools. Many of these students experience social inequality, violence at home, and high levels of poverty. Once access to education expanded, many of the more affluent parents transferred their children to the private school system; this created the stereotype that public education in Brazil is “for the poor” and of significantly lower quality than private schools (Dayrell, 2007). This explicitly explains inequalities and opportunities that are limited to certain groups of young people (Andrade and Neto, 2004: 56).

Using this framework, we can argue the existence of multiple types of young people. According to Dayrell (2003), youth consists of a series of experiences lived by individuals in different contexts (i.e. socioeconomic, ethnic, generational, and even geographic) who each have different ways of interpreting politics and democracy. Above all, within the context of social inequality in the country, it is clear that homogeneous youth do not exist, but only:

---

\(^3\) The National Examination of Secondary Education (Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio - ENEM) is regulated by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) and the National Institute of Educational Studies and Research (INEP). The main objective of the examination is to “evaluate the performance of the student at the end of basic schooling, in order to assess the development of fundamental skills for the full exercise of citizenship” (ENEM 1999). Besides assessing the quality of high school education, in recent years it has also served as the main method of admittance to public universities.
(...), youth groups that constitute a heterogeneous group, with different portions of opportunities, difficulties, facilities and power in societies. In this sense, youth, by definition, is a social construction, that is, the production of a certain society originated from the multiple forms it sees young people, a production in which are conjugated, among other factors, stereotypes, historical moments, multiple references, as well as different and diverse situations of class, gender, ethnicity, group, etc. (Esteves and Abramovay, 2004: 21).

Thus, different youths will have different influences in regard to his/her understanding of the democratic process and the ways in which it unfolds in the country. In the empirical part of this article, we used data from Democracy, media and social capital: a comparative study of the socialization of young people in the South of Brazil – a study carried out by the Research Centre on Latin America (NUPESAL) in 2015/2016 in the cities of Porto Alegre, Florianópolis, and Curitiba to learn how different youths understand the meaning of democracy.

4. The multiple understandings of democracy by young people in southern Brazil

As previously discussed in this article, we believe in the existence of different types of youths – since each has a different perspective about what constitutes democracy. To test this hypothesis, we used data from NUPESAL’s surveys in: Porto Alegre (between April and June of 2015; 690 young people participated); Florianópolis (from May to June of 2016; 571 youths participated); and Curitiba (in April 2016; 774 young people participated). All people surveyed were between 13 and 24 years old, from public and private schools, and from all high school grade levels. The sample was randomized and stratified through the multiple stages process.

Aiming to analyze the democracy issue, we analyzed the results from the question: “When you think of democracy which of the items comes to your mind?” The respondents were asked to indicate first, second, and third values within the list showed in the Graph 1.
Graph 1: When you think of democracy which of the items comes to your mind? (% of mentions by public school students vs. private school students)

As presented in the graph above, the most mentioned categories were “respect the rights of all” and “freedom of speech,” resulting in a prevalence of self-expression values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009); this points to an intergenerational shift, which is slightly stronger among private school students. Voting, the central feature of democratic systems, is in third place – showing that youths think the formal and institutional aspects are significant to democracy. These data indicate that despite seeing voting as important, youths in general associate democracy more to subjective values related to the quality of democracy rather than to its institutional design – in other words, they think about the democratic system beyond the “rules of the game.”
On the other hand, we can see that to public school students material values still remain an issue since 6.5% answered “no poverty” and 6.28% “peace” – in contrast to the 2.67% and 2.87% (respectively) from private school students. Such data can indicate the realities related to social class (which sometimes include violence and social vulnerability) that some public-school students face; this shows that this group has unmet material needs that youths attending private schools do not face.

**Graph 2**: Interest in politics

![Graph 2: Interest in politics](image)


* sig ≤ 0.00

Graph 3 illustrates the empirical consequences from the differences of education quality and the construction of values in relation to feelings about politics:
As Graph 3 illustrates, the state of being interested in politics showed an approximately 10% difference between public and private school students. Reviewing the percentages for feelings of disillusion and indifference, we can also note that these feelings are more present in young people attending public schools; this can again be explained by the fact they do not see their basic needs being met. On the other hand, when we analyzed the responses for participation, students from public schools expressed more interest in this area than their private school counterparts. We next looked at political efficacy and perceived system responsiveness in order better understand the results in Graphs 1, 2, and 3.

5. Political efficacy and perceived system responsiveness

As we previously mentioned, a sense of efficacy and system responsiveness is one of the main aspects that encourages people in general (especially youths) to engage in politics. Since the 1950s in political science and since the mid-1970s in psychology, many scholars have been debating the concept of political efficacy (Campbell, Gurin and Miller, 1954; Almond and Verba,
1963; Easton and Dennis, 1967; Beaumont, 2010; Verba, Scholzman and Brady, 1995). Although they disagree in some aspects regarding definitions or methods of measurement, most authors corroborate that strong political efficacy is positive for democracy and correlates with political participation. In contrast to the two-dimensional approach that considers efficacy as internal or external (Easton and Dennis, 1967; Niemi, Craig and Mattei, 1991; Kahne and Westheimer, 2006), Sofia Sohl (2014) proposes to treat external efficacy as isolated from the concept of efficacy policy (she uses the term perceived system responsiveness) being treated as the perceptions of governmental and institutional responsiveness to the demands and needs of citizens.

In this framework, we attempted to evaluate how public and private school students perceived system responsiveness by analyzing if they agreed, partly agreed, or disagreed with these statements: 1) All politicians are corrupt; 2) Politicians promise, then do not comply; and 3) Politicians are all the same. The results are displayed in Graph 4:

**Graph 4:** Perceived system responsiveness among public and private school students

![Graph showing perceived system responsiveness among public and private school students](image)

Source: NUPESAL (2015, 2016)
N: 1964 sig * sig ≤ 0.00

All three statements surveyed demonstrated a weak sense of responsiveness regarding politicians and politics in general. Public school students showed higher levels of distrust and negativity in all categories, which can be attributed to their wider feelings of disillusion and disinterest in politics as reported in the last section. Regarding the first question, 26.9% of public school students agreed with the statement that “all politicians are corrupt,” while only 12.7% of
private school students agreed. Correspondingly, the number of private school students that disagreed was 11.4% higher than public school students.

The statement that "politicians promise, then do not comply" has a 15.3% higher agreement rate in public schools. Out of the public-school students polled, 97.8% either agree or partly agree that "politicians promise, then do not comply". The number is also very high in private schools, where 96.7% agree or partly agree that politicians do not comply with their promises. However, 57.9% of private school students only partly agree with this statement. The results from the statement that "politicians are all the same" showed marked contrast. Almost 60% of the students from the public system agree or partly agree that politicians are all the same, while almost 60% of students private schools disagree with this statement. What we concluded from the survey is that public school students, who most likely come from a lower-income family, have a worse perspective about politics than students who attend private schools.

We also attempted to measure the political efficacy among young people – in other words, how much they believe their actions can affect politics. We studied how they responded to three statements: 1) People like my family have no influence on government actions; 2) There’s no point in participating in politics because it never changes anything; and 3) Political issues are very complicated for me, so I’m not interested. Graph 5 shows the results.

**Graph 5: Political efficacy of students in public and private schools**

![Graph showing political efficacy of students in public and private schools](chart.png)

Source: NUPESAL (2015, 2016)

N: 1964 sig * sig ≤ 0,00
About 73.1% of public-school students agreed or partially agreed with the statement "people like my family have no influence on government actions". However, only 62% of private school students agreed or partially agreed with the statement. Even though both numbers are high and have about an 11% difference, the main difference is that 42.8% of public-school students agreed with the sentence only 27.2% of private school students felt the same way when polled.

The difference among the two groups is higher in the next two statements. For example, 58.3% of students from public schools agreed that "there is no point in participating in politics, because it never changes anything". In contrast, only 38% of private school students agreed with this statement. This coincides with the literature that shows students are much more inclined to participate or be interested in politics if their basic needs are met (Ribeiro, 2008).

The last statement is "political issues are very complicated for me, so I'm not interested". Although the responses this question is more positive for both groups, the difference among private and public-school students is significant when compared to the second statement. About 23.6% of students from public schools declared they are not interested in politics because they think the subject is too complicated, while only 9.4% of private school students shared that sentiment. This shows how different types of education affect the development of political competencies. According to Elizabeth Beaumont (2010), civic resources that help us feel politically effective include cognitive, informational, motivational, social, and cultural resources – especially knowledge, skills, orientations, social networks, and relevant political experiences. These are often acquired through high-quality education, high-status jobs, and inclusion in community groups and social networks that encourage greater civic involvement (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). In this framework, high status coincides with political efficacy because it serves as a vehicle for acquiring the civic resources that stimulate political trust.

Regarding the origins of political efficacy in the population and its relation to political participation, several studies point out that individuals with a privileged economic situation, as well as a higher educational level, tend to be more politically engaged because they not feel only more effective and willing, but are also more capable of acting in the political environment. The opposite is also true – those who have fewer resources as well as fewer political and educational advantages tend to feel less competent (Almond and Verba, 1963; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Beaumont, 2010). This trend is even stronger among young people (Banks and Roker, 1994; Beaumont, 2010). Hence, it is evident how the educational and socioeconomic systems sustain a structural basis of inequalities that are also reproduced throughout generations. On the other hand, political efficacy is more malleable by its nature – especially in the process of political socialization (Bernardi, 2017).
6. Final considerations

This article analyzed what young people in Southern Brazil think about democracy as well as how they understand and interact with politics. Our aim was to evaluate if the different political socialization processes that coincide with the pervasive social inequality in Brazil create different types of youths with different perspectives of democracy. To test our hypothesis, we studied data from a survey conducted with secondary school students from Porto Alegre, Curitiba, and Florianópolis for values related to democracy, feelings about politics, responsiveness, and political efficacy.

Using education in the formative years as an economic security index (Abramson and Inglehart, 1994) and since school is a space that reveals inequalities among different groups of youngsters (Andrade and Neto, 2004), we showed the differences between students from public and private schools – considering how different their living situations can be. Even if voting is still strongly related to democracy in both groups, a prevalence of self-expression values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009) – mainly in the private education system – indicated the expected intergenerational value shifts. Indexes of education quality such as the ENEM show a great correlation between civic competence and school quality (Bernardi, 2017). By relating the ENEM grades in the schools on which the survey was applied, the private system appears to have distinct superior grades compared to its counterpart, showing signs of inequality in schools.

Using this framework, according to the scholar census made by the INEP in 2014, around 87% of enrollments in high schools in Southern Brazil are through the public system (on the municipal, federal, and state levels). This relates to the works of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) and Hoskins et al. (2008) that socioeconomic restrictions determine political socialization, especially in creating civic competencies. Therefore, the education system maintains society’s economic and social inequality. However, the history of education in Brazil gets mixed up with its citizenship history because the right of education for marginalized groups became a reality in the late 20th century (Iosif, 2007:19).

In this sense, we can observe the permanence of survival values on the students from the public system, whose schools present a lower quality level compared to the private schools. The mentions of values such as “peace”, “respect the rights of all”, and “no poverty” are substantially higher among students from public schools because they are more often exposed to elements of familial violence, inequality, and poverty than their counterparts from private schools.

We also observed that public school students have more negative perceptions about politicians as well as the system, since most do not believe the system is meeting their material needs covered; hence, they are less concerned about their role in politics because they do not think they can actually influence politics. On the other hand, private school students seem to have more resources to evaluate the system and reported more positive visions about politics. This is
likely because private school students generally are not exposed to poverty and feel less neglected by the system; hence, they have more confidence in their abilities to influence politics.

In conclusion, we acknowledge a pattern that followed the main hypothesis of this article. We studied young people in Southern Brazil from different socioeconomic backgrounds, which affect and the quality of education and socialization; this creates contrasting values about democracy and differing attitudes towards politics.

7. Bibliography


DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.31068/tp.27207
(27 November 2016).


